Sunday, April 17, 2011
War and the American Presidency: Bush Doctrine revisited
Wednesday, April 13, 2011
War Powers Resolution and Youngstown Sheet: How Much Power Should the President Have?
On June 2, 1952, Justice Jackson delivered a concurrent opinion in the case of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer that would essentially shape the symbiotic relationship between the president and Congress and the ability of the Court to influence the law.
Justice Jackson, in writing one of nine different opinions, states that the relationship of the Congress and the presidency is one of flexibility and fluctuation. In particular, Jackson states that there are three instances in which “a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers and they are as follows:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty…
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility…
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter…
Essentially, what these state are that the president has three tiers of power when it comes to its relationship with the Congress. The first stipulation incurs that the president’s power is at its maximum when they act in accordance with Congressional approval or within their constitutional limits as President of the United States. The second point outlines the fact that the president’s power is only moderately influential without the consent or approval of Congress, he may only use those powers that are granted to himself independently by Article II or those that are, at certain times, grey areas between the president and Congress. Thirdly, the president’s “power is at his lowest ebb” when he acts in conflict with the will of Congress since he may only rely on the independent powers of Article II.
While Jackson outlines this definition of power as it relates to Congress and the President. Jackson also identifies the relationship of the president and the Supreme Court as it relates to how the president maintains their respect or abuse of Congressional will. Firstly, Jackson states, “any seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.” What this implies is that the Court would support the president with the widest, broadest interpretation of the law so long as he is acting in accordance with Congressional will. Secondly, if the President acts against the “implied will of Congress,” the Court will “only sustain exclusive presidential control…by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.” Along with this differentiation, the Court also recognized the fact that there exist “inherent president powers ex necessitate” in the even of a crisis. Seemingly, what this reveals about the Court is that is it more willing to grant the president more power when he acts in pursuance of Congressional will but becomes more scrutinized when the executive acts against it. It seems this is instance where the role of the Court is not only interpreting the law, but helping to create it. By becoming more scrutinized when a president acts against the will of Congress they are almost insuring that their powers become more exclusive and that the wishes of Congress are maintained.
Justice Jackson’s opinion also deals with the convention role of separation of powers in our government. He states, “Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.” However, what he says definitively is that nothing is clearer in our Constitution than the fact that the declaration of war belongs to Congress. The president, thus, has the Constitutional right to be the commander in chief of the Army and Navy, yet Congress is the only one who has the ability to provide him with that Army and Navy. This interpretation is extremely narrow in regards to the separation of powers as defined by the Constitution. However, because Justice Jackson has interpreted that there do exist inherent powers of the president and that there are grey areas in which Congressional actions and Presidential action collide, there exists a certain vagueness that provides loopholes in the president’s ability to make decisions and implement his will. This represents a question that refers back to previous journals: Do we wish to have a strong unitary executive or not?
This implication is vast for the regular conduct of government. By implying that the president has inherent powers, it also insinuates that there are these loopholes that the president may use to go around the will of Congress and implement his will. These loopholes are no better exemplified than by the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Because of the vague language like “consult” and “every possible instance,” it leaves the president’s requirements at his discretion. It also allows for the president to commit troops without the prior approval of Congress. There are also problems inherent with the War Powers Resolution. For example, the sixty-day requirement for the president to report his actions to Congress could result in troops becoming overly committed in a nation, thus making them unable to reasonably withdraw troops.
What can be concluded from both of these documents is that our government in flawed. There exist many loopholes, which the president and Congress can exploit to their benefit. In regards to presidential power, Justice Jackson states, “The executive action we have here originates in the individual will of the President, and represents an exercise of authority without law. No one, perhaps not even the President, knows the limits of the power he may seek to exert in this instance... What is true is that nations that have leaders who abuse power are “destined to pass away.” What remains to be seen is whether or not our nation will suffer that same fate.
Monday, April 11, 2011
Humanitarian Doctrine of Foreign Policy: Clinton and Obama in Kosovo and Libya
The interconnections of factors that involve United States entry into foreign arenas have been a major topic of interest for political scientists and historians alike. Foreign policy decisions made by our executives are always being critiqued, especially when they involve committing our nation into foreign affairs that seemingly have nothing to do with how our country functions. This was exactly the case with the United States intervention in Kosovo and Libya under the Clinton and Obama administrations, respectively. Both presidents, however, outlined their reasoning and thoughts to the American public in addresses on nation television. Considering both occurrences and how strikingly congruent they both are, it is no wonder that there are a multitude of similarities between the two speeches. What is more revealing are the differences that are between the two and their purposes.
Firstly, between President Obama and President Clinton’s speeches, there exist many obvious similarities. Both presidents express their indebtedness to the members of the armed forces that serve their nation with “courage, professionalism, and patriotism.” Both presidents acknowledge the economic and logistical risks associated with fighting in a foreign nation. Both presidents highlight the direct locations of where these nations are for reasons that are critical to the United States intervention. President Obama reveals that further oppression by Muammar Gaddafi would lead to thousands of refugees fleeing to other nations in the surrounding areas, including Egypt and Tunisia, which already have considerable strains as a result of fragile transitions of power. President Clinton provides a similar reasoning. Clinton argues that there are “other small countries struggling with their own economic and political challenges…that would be overwhelmed by waves of refugees from Kosovo.” Next, both presidents clearly use pathos to appeal to their viewer’s emotions and tell a story of mass tyranny of a dictator. President Obama tells of Gaddafi’s oppression with explicit imagery:
“In the face of the world's condemnation, Gaddafi chose to escalate his attacks, launching a military campaign against the Libyan people. Innocent people were targeted for killing. Hospitals and ambulances were attacked. Journalists were arrested, sexually assaulted, and killed. Supplies of food and fuel were choked off. The water for hundreds of thousands of people in Misratah was shut off. Cities and towns were shelled, mosques destroyed, and apartment buildings reduced to rubble. Military jets and helicopter gunships were unleashed upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assault from the air.”
Clinton does the same thing when referring to the atrocities committed by Slobodan Milosevic:
“Now they've started moving from village to village, shelling civilians and torching their houses. We've seen innocent people taken from their homes, forced to kneel in the dirt, and sprayed with bullets; Kosovar men dragged from their families, fathers and sons together, lined up and shot in cold blood. This is not war in the traditional sense. It is an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose leaders already have agreed to peace.”
Both Presidents offered the respective dictators an ultimatum or face the consequences of their actions. A more important similarity was the emphasis that both President Clinton and President Obama placed on the fact that the United States was not acting alone and that other countries were helping to form a “growing coalition” to defend the Kosovar and Libyan people. Both presidents reiterated their intentions to halt from committing troops to the foreign nations and maintained that America’s role would be limited. Clinton and Obama overly emphasized the importance of NATO. In Libya, NATO was to take control of the “enforcement of the arms embargo and the No Fly Zone” and the “responsibility of protecting Libyan civilians.” Similarly, in Kosovo, NATO’s role was to implement a “peacekeeping force.”
There are only few differences between the two speeches. President Clinton’s speech was relatively short and to the point. He relayed the information that he felt was sufficient to justify the United States involvement in Kosovo. On the other hand, Obama’s speech almost doubled the length of Clinton’s, which I believe is a result of Obama outlining his foreign policy doctrine, which we will get to shortly.
Both President’s Obama and Clinton outlined their main reasons for action in Kosovo and Libya. Clinton opens up his speech almost instantly with specific reasons for American intervention. Clinton states,
“We act to protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive. We act to prevent a wider war, to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results. And we act to stand united with our allies for peace. By acting now, we are upholding our values, protecting our interests, and advancing the cause of peace.”
Summarily, Clinton recognized the moral necessity to protect the citizens of Kosovo, unlike he had done with those in Rwanda. A wider war in Europe would have detrimental effects on the United States economically and politically. Thirdly, upholding the legitimacy of newly developed NATO. If the credibility of NATO was threatened by any dictator, the safety other third world nations would be jeopardized. Along with these three ideas, Clinton also asserts the importance of action to prove to domestic critics that Democrats do have the ability to staunchly stand up for what they believe is the right course of action and act in war if necessary. Finally, since Clinton was unwilling to commit American forces, and NATO forces were willing to do most of the intervention, many viewed the United States role as acceptable. This also represented one of the first instances where intervention on behalf of a valid humanitarian effort was going to be a shared burden by the world community.
Obama’s main focus was that the United States has a “responsibility to act” when its interests and values are at stake. Our nation was founded on the principles of freedom and democracy and when an oppressive dictator is challenging either of these interests, the United States has a responsibility to intervene. In Libya, civilians were being “brutally repressed” and there existed a “looming humanitarian crisis” of individuals being massacred. While the safety of the Libyan citizens is the main goal, a secondary goal is returning the “state of Libya to its people.“ Finally, Obama reiterated that strategic interests would be challenged by Gaddafi’s oppression. The fleeing of refugees into neighboring Egypt and Tunisia would severely “strain the fragile transitions in these countries.”
Both Presidents provide their arguments in compelling ways in an attempt to win over the American people. However, I believe that only President Obama’s speech outlines a “doctrine” of sorts that outlines rules for engagement in foreign countries. He provides many conditions under which the United States has an obligation to respond. He states:
“For generations, the United States of America has played a unique role as an anchor of global security and advocate for human freedom…We are naturally reluctant to use force to solve the world's many challenges. But when our interests and values are at stake, we have a responsibility to act.”
This is the entire premise for Obama’s doctrine: The United States has a responsibility to intervene when its interests and values are threatened. Obama elaborates further on the new role that America will play on foreign affairs. The president wishes for America to play a more limited, supporting role, especially in Libya. After NATO forces take over, Obama argues that:
“the United States will play a supporting role - including intelligence, logistical support, search and rescue assistance, and capabilities to jam regime communications…”
Another provision of “Obama’s doctrine” is an international responsibility for the burden of actions, instead of an American responsibility. While America as a world power has a great amount of influence on the outcomes of international crises, it cannot be expected to be the only one funding the help and establishing new international regimes. Obama says:
“While the United States will do our part to help, it will be a task for the international community, and - more importantly - a task for the Libyan people themselves...broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake…the burden of action should not be America’s alone”
Finally, Obama establishes the final point, an alternative doctrine from the Bush administration and that is “American cannot use our military wherever repression occurs.” However, Obama goes on to say that his greatest responsibility is “keeping the country safe,” even if it entails the use of the military to “defend our people, our homeland, our allies, and our core interests.”
Based on the doctrine as outlined by Obama and in vagueness by Clinton. American should intervene in certain instances where its interests and values are stake or threatened. Therefore, cases like the Ivory Coast conflicts would not be grounds for intervention because they directly harm the interests of France. Not to mention the fact that the UN has recently declared the Ivory conflict concluded. The Obama administration would also not risk losing a major ally in attacking Saudi Arabia for its actions in Bahrain, even though relations between the allies have seemed to be deteriorating. White House spokesman Jay Carney, avoided criticism of their ally, by saying the Saudi’s actions did not constitute “an invasion of the country” to the White House. However, I believe that according to “Obama’s doctrine” he does have justification to intervene in Yemen. Yemen has been a strategic initiative, especially recently, in fighting an offshoot of al Qaeda. If Yemen’s leader were to fall, these initiatives would cease and the US would lose a nation that borders, arguably, their most important ally in the Middle East in Saudi Arabia. This poses a direct national security threat to the United States and could require intervention, which I believe Obama has grounds for.
Summarily, I believe that “Obama's doctrine” is very similar to the stance taken by Clinton in the Kosovo conflict and I believe that it is a great basis for governmental action in foreign nations. While expressing a set of conditions under which to intervene there is also room for judgment, in outlying cases. What is definite in the foreign policy arena is that political scientists will continue to look at these situations and our president’s responses in hopes of establishing a true doctrine of American intervention. What remains to be seen is if it will ever be possible. I believe not.
And if youre not tired of reading, here is more information on understanding the Kosovo conflict from an well respected scholar: